IRISH INDEPENDENCE or EUROPEAN SUPERSTATE

PANA Document

“We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of
Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be
sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a
foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor
can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish
people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their
right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the last
three hundred years they have asserted in arms. Standing on that
fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the
world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign
Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives our
comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of
its exaltation among the nations.
The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance
of every Irishman and Irishwomen. The Republic guarantees
religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all
its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and
prosperity of the whole nation and all of its parts, cherishing all of
the children of the nation equally and oblivious of the differences
carefully fostered by an alien government which have divided a
minority from the majority in the past.”
1916 Proclamation

“Sometimes I like to compare the EU as a
creation to the organisation of Empire.
We have the dimensions of Empire”
Jose Barroso,
President of the EU Commission
speaking on the renamed EU Constitution
(the Lisbon Treaty) in Strasburg 10/7/07
“Are we all clear that we want to build something
that can aspire to be a world power?”
Romano Prodi, then President of the EU Commission
speaking to the EU Parliament 13/2/01
“For the first time, Europe has a shared Constitution.
This pact is the point of no return. Europe is becoming
an irreversible project, irrevocable after the ratification
of this treaty. It is a new era for Europe, a new
geography, a new history”
The Prime Minister of France,
Jean-Pierre Raffarin,
Le Metro(7/10/04)

A European Battle fought on Irish soil
For generation after generation some Irish people have fought for Irish
Independence while others fought for Imperialism. While some gave their
allegiance - like the United Irishmen, the Young Irelanders and the Fenians – to the
Republic, others supported Home Rule within an Empire and advocated Irish
participation in its Battle Groups. This involved taking part in wars throughout the
world in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and the Sudan.
That Irish Imperialist tradition has now been restored as the dominant ideology of
the Irish political elite.

Since 1996 the Peace & Neutrality Alliance has opposed its restoration. We were
the only alliance that campaigned against the Amsterdam Treaty when 38% of the
people voted in favour of Irish Independence.
We played a key role in winning the 1st Nice referendum, which had the effect of
ensuring the “triple lock” legislation. We also secured a Declaration in favour of Irish
neutrality being added to the treaty, plus the establishment of the National Forum
on Europe, all of which helped the government win the 2nd Nice referendum.
Now, the “triple lock” legislation has been emasculated and our neutrality
destroyed. Ireland has become an integral part of Bush’s war machine, and the
National Forum on Europe little more than an EU elite fan club.
Now, the government seeks the support of the Irish people in the referendum on
the renamed EU Constitution (the Lisbon Treaty), which is essentially the same
treaty that was rejected by the French and Dutch people. The elite changed its
name to ensure there would be no more referendums in any of the other states of
the EU because they know that they would be defeated. The only reason Ireland is
having a referendum is as a consequence of our struggle for National
Independence which ensures we have an Irish Constitution, that includes article 6
that states that all power derives from the people and cannot be transferred from
them to the institutions of the emerging European Superstate without their consent.
Our Supreme Court made that judgment in favour of the case brought by
Raymond Crotty.

In an Irish context, this referendum is just another battle between those of us
who believe in Irish Independence and those that support a Superstate. But
because none of the other peoples of the EU are being allowed to have a
referendum it is also a European battle that will be fought on Irish soil. It is a
battle between those of us who advocate a Partnership Europe, a Partnership of
Independent Democratic States, legal equals, without a military dimension, and
those that advocate a European centralised, militarised, neo-liberal superstate,
allied to the US and actively engaged in the resource wars of the 21st century.
The defeat of the EU/US/NATO axis is the only inevitable outcome.
We seek a NO vote, so a new treaty can be agreed that would include a
Protocol along the following line that would exclude us from involvement with or
paying for the militarisation of the EU:
“With regard to measures adopted by the Council in the relevant
articles, Ireland does not participate in the elaboration and
implementation of decisions and actions which have defence
implications, but will not prevent the development of closer
cooperation between member states in this area. Therefore Ireland
shall not participate in their adoption. Ireland shall not contribute to
the financing of the operational expenditure arising from such
measures.”
In this pamphlet PANA outlines the military dimension of the renamed EU
Constitution and would hope you will vote no and join us in advocating Irish
Independence, Irish Democracy and Irish Neutrality. It will be held in the year
that marks the 90th anniversary of the historic vote in 1918 when the Irish
people voted for the Republic. PANA calls upon the people to once again
confirm their commitment to that Republic by voting no to this Imperial Charter.
Roger Cole,
Chair,
Peace & Neutrality Alliance
2008

THE MILITARY DIMENSION
By Carol Fox, Research Officer of PANA
Introduction:
It’s Bastille Day, 2007. Newly elected French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, stands in the
back of a military jeep, leading the parade as it progresses down the Champs Elysee
and circles the Arc de Triomphe. But this is a Bastille Day with a difference. For the first
time, thanks to Sarkozy’s ‘European Vision’, troops from all the 27 EU Member-States,
including Ireland, are marching behind Sarkozy and his jeep, parading their colours.
“In a carefully prepared display, a V formation of flag-bearers preceded the 800-strong
European guest parade with the EU and French flags at the front. That came after
some 4000 French military marched by and air force jets made a flyover in a show of
military might”. [Reuters: “European Troops March in Paris on Bastille Day”, July 14,
2007].
The night before, the French President had given a speech to EU defence ministers
and French military officers, re-iterating his push for a European-wide defence. The
French Defence Minister, Herve Morin, has since spoken of the need for a more
‘muscular’ presence by Europe on the world stage and has outlined France’s plans to
‘press ahead with a Europe of Defence’ during the French EU Presidency in the latter
half of 2008. [UPI, Nov. 13, 2007].
Sarkozy is not alone. Other EU leaders share his desire to boost the EU’s defences,
including the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel: “Within the EU itself, we will have to
move closer to establishing a common European army” [March 23, 2007, Bild]. Even
the EU sceptical UK has called for improved EU military capabilities: “It’s frankly
embarrassing that European nations – with about two million men and
women under arms – are only able, at a stretch, to deploy around 100,000
at any one time”. [UK Foreign Secretary, David Milliband, Nov. 15, 2007, during a
speech at the College of Europe in Bruges]. The Portuguese Defence Minister,
speaking on behalf of the Government holding the EU Presidency when the new
Lisbon Treaty was finalized said: “Defence is a vital driver of integration today”
and the EU has to strengthen its military rapid response capacity, bolster its defence
industry, etc. And “all this should complement NATO”. [The Guardian, September
26, 2007]
Whatever you call it – the Lisbon Treaty or the Renamed EU Constitution – it does not
disappoint in terms of moving the EU defence agenda forward.
This PANA document is a revision of the document published in February 2005, ‘Yes
to Europe, No to Superstate’, which analysed the EU Constitution. As we know, that
Constitution was defeated by the French and Dutch ‘No’ votes later that year. But as
we also know, that defeat was not respected. We now have back before us the old

Constitution, -- devoid of its more obvious constitutional trappings – but still
containing many of the basics of the original document, including all the defence
provisions. The main difference between the documents is that the Treaty is even
more unreadable, and more inscrutable than the proposed Constitution. This is
deliberate. It is also deliberate that EU leaders have instructed the bureaucrats in
Brussels to revise the Constitution in such a way that referendums can be avoided:
the people mustn’t be allowed to decide, there must be no repeat of the French and
Dutch votes.
Ireland is the one exception. This is not thanks to a magnanimous and principled
Irish Government who believe in allowing the people to decide about their sovereign
rights. It’s thanks to the late Raymond Crotty who fought the Irish Government up to
the Irish Supreme Court to ensure that our Constitutional rights would be fully
protected by requiring such referendums.
This pamphlet is PANA’s contribution to the debate on the new Treaty. It begins with
an update of events since the EU Constitution was defeated and then focuses on the
military provisions of the new Treaty. In terms of the latter, much is the same as in
the Constitution. Only the Articles have changed. The new Treaty still contains:
1) institutional measures to give the EU a stronger voice and role in
international affairs, including a permanent EU President, an EU Foreign
Minister in all but name (now to be called High Representative of the Union
for Foreign and Security Policy), and an EU Department of Foreign Affairs
(European External Action Service)
2) the incorporation of the European Defence Agency into the EU treaties.
The EDA’s purpose is to promote the arms industry, and to assist in the
development of the EU’s defence capabilities.
3) An obligation (related to the EDA) for member states to build-up their
military capacities
4) An expansion of the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ to be carried out by the EU’s
civilian and military forces, to include combating terrorism, and possible preemptive
military action against perceived ‘threats’;
5) A new innovation, Structured Cooperation, which allows mini-military
alliances to be established within the structures of the EU to carry out the
EU’s more ‘demanding’ missions;
6) Mutual Solidarity and Mutual Defence Clauses which oblige all member
states to come to the assistance of any member state subject to armed
aggression, terrorist threat or attack, or manmade/natural disaster.
Background:
Our previous pamphlet on the EU Constitution outlined the EU’s new Security
Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, written by the High Representative for
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javiar Solana, and endorsed by the EU in

2003. We listed concerns raised about the Solana document by a number of NGOs,
including the strategy’s over-emphasis on military solutions and approaches to
security problems, its failure to address root causes of conflict, and its codification of
preventive war: (“Our traditional concept of self-defence…was based on the threat of
invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad… we
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs”). There were also worries that
humanitarian assistance could be mis-used as a ‘weapon’ of EU security and defence
policy with such aid’s primary purpose of helping those in need being shunted aside.
[See http://www.pana.ie/idn/100205.html]
But this is the strategy that continues to guide the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy. The Solana European Security Strategy was given a further boost in
November 2006 by a resolution before the European Parliament on its
implementation. By a vote of 414 to 117, the Parliament approved a report
highlighting the links with NATO, stating that the “EU is on the way to developing
into a Security and Defence Union”, and calls for the “establishment of a common
market in the field of defence”, the “setting up of a European standing naval force”,
and the establishment of an EU defence budget. [2006/2033(INI)]
The fact – as PANA has continually highlighted – that the EU does not see the need
for securing a UN mandate before dispatching its military forces abroad is an
additional reason to be wary of the EU’s heightened sense of World Role. Just as
President George Bush is prepared to ‘go it alone’ in international intervention, so is
the EU: references are made to observing the UN Charter (similar references are in
the NATO treaty) but no where does it state – in the EU treaties, the defeated EU
Constitution, or the successor Treaty – that the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force, or its new
Battlegroups, require a UN mandate before being deployed.
1. The Rapid Reaction Force
and the EU Battlegroups
The EU’s Rapid Reaction Force has not developed as rapidly as the EU had hoped. In
December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the so-called Headline Goals were
agreed requiring Member States to contribute to an EU military capability to deploy
60,000+ troops within 60 days outside the EU: the Rapid Reaction Force.
However, by 2003 it was obvious there were major capability gaps, and the smaller,
less ambitious EU Battlegroups’ concept was launched to speed up delivery of the
larger RRF. The Battlegroups would consist of 1,500-2,500 troops, deployable within
5- 15 days, and having capabilities for high intensity operations. An article in NATO
Review, Summer 2007, described the Battlegroups as “providing the EU with ‘ready
to go’ military capability, to respond to crises around the world”. NATO is developing
its own Response Force but steps have been taken to prevent any overlap:

“Conscious of potential duplication between the NRF and the EU’s Battlegroups, NATO
and the EU have started work on ensuring that the two forces can complement each
other”. [More about the Battlegroups below]. [See PANA document on EU
Battlegroups: http://www.pana.ie/idn/160106.html]
The EU also decided in 2003 to launch a new Headline Goal for 2010 and to
propose this alongside the above mentioned Solana Security Strategy of December
2003. The new Headline Goal envisioned that member states “be able by 2010 to
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole
spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European
Union”. [Council of the EU, Document 6805/03].
The European Council of June 17, 2004, under the Irish Presidency, gave final
approval to the 2010 Headline goals. The Council reaffirmed the necessity of the EU
being capable of fulfilling a ‘spectrum of crisis management operations’, including
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking (the so-called Petersberg Tasks agreed to in the
Amsterdam Treaty). However, the Council goes on to say: “As indicated by the
European Security Strategy (Javier Solana’s document] this might also include joint
disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and
security sector reform, The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive
engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to
conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at
different levels of engagement”. [emphasis added]
The Council statement also highlighted the need for the member states’ military
forces to have a high degree of interoperability at “technical, procedural and
conceptual levels” and that a “commonality of security culture should also be promoted”.
It then turns to the EU’s links with NATO, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements
which “enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the
strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis managements”. The
operational doctrines of the EU’s military forces will be “in coherence with NATO”.
Mr. Ahern, Taoiseach of Ireland, not only agreed to this Council Statement but
presided over it as EU President. Ireland is now in a “strategic partnership” with NATO
and agrees that the operational doctrines of the Irish armed forces, as channelled
through the EU, should be “in coherence with NATO”. The Taoiseach also on our
behalf signed up for “preventive engagement” and for a promotion of a “commonality
of security culture”. Given that most of our EU partners are in NATO, a military pact
based on nuclear weapons and the possible first use of nuclear weapons, this all
doesn’t bode well for Ireland, a.k.a. neutral country, model UN peacekeeper and
promoter of nuclear non-proliferation.

By 2007, although its Rapid Reaction force was still not up and marching, the EU had
made considerable progress towards achieving the 2010 Headline Goals, EU forces
had been operating abroad, the Battlegroups had become operational, and an agency
dedicated to promoting armaments had been established within the EU. When the
2010 Headline Goals were agreed, there were certain milestones set out:
1) a bolstered EU military command [This has happened, including a new
EU Operations Centre opened in Brussels in June 2007];
2) the European Armaments Agency [Now called the European Defence
Agency. It is up and running, only to be formalized in the Treaty];
3) EU strategic lift joint coordination by 2005 [This is now beginning to
happen via cooperation with NATO states: the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
(SALIS), which the EU Council Secretariat instances as ‘a good example of the
fruitful cooperation in finding effective and efficient solutions to overlapping
capability shortfalls of the EU and NATO’]
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MilitaryCapabilitiesFC06back...
undNov06_en.pdf];
4) capability and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets
(terrestrial and space based) by 2010 [This is progressing, with the EDA
promoting R and D in the area and with the functioning Operations Centre.
The Director of the EU’s Civilian/Military Cell, Brigadier General Heinrich
Brauss, reported to the European Parliament sub-committee on Security and
Defence, in early 2007: “The technical Operations Centre facilities have been
established in the Kortenberg Building and are ready for use. The communication
links have been installed, which provide a network within the General Secretariat
and link up with the other HQ’s, the EU Cell at SHAPE, the EU Liaison Officer at
the UN/DPKO, and – through satellite links and deployable communications
packages – with Force Headquarters that could be deployed in the field all over
the world.”]
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070227BriefingCCMBrauss
toEP.pdf
5) development of the rapidly deployable battlegroups by 2007 [This has
happened. Full operational capability was achieved in January 2007,
comprising a joint German, Dutch and Finnish BG and a French-Belgian-
Luxembourg BG. From mid 2007, two other battlegroups were placed on
standby, comprising an Italian, Hungarian and Slovenian Battlegroup and a
Greek-led HELBROC Balkan Battlegroup . According to above referenced EU
Council Secretariat November 2006 ‘Background’ paper: “the Member-States
have committed the required number of Battlegroup packages for 2007/8 and
9. “The member States providing Battlegroups in the first half of 2007 have
decided to provide naval enablers for these Battlegroups. From January 2007
onwards the EU will have full operational capability to undertake two
Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations nearly simultaneously”].

The Nordic Battlegroup that Ireland has now joined – consisting also of Finland,
Norway, Estonia, and Sweden – has been on standby from January 1, 2008
Oireachtas approval was given to Irish participation in the Nordic Battlegroup in
July 2006 via the Defence (Amendment) Act 2006. It was debated in the last days
of the Dail session for only a few hours and voted through at midnight on July 4th.
Only twelve TDs voted against, including the Greens, Sinn Fein, three
independents and Joe Higgins. The Labour Party abstained.
Ireland is the only country in the EU which requires a UN “mandate” before its
troops are sent abroad. EU Battlegroups are to be deployed within 5 to 10 days
and waiting for a UN mandate could make Battlegroup membership awkward for
Ireland. The Government had also been advised that Irish troops could not go
abroad for military training under current legislation. Therefore, the Defence Acts
had to be amended. The definition of a UN ‘mandate’ was expanded and thereby
diluted. Irish troops can now go off with the Battlegroup prior to UN approval – to
be rapidly ‘assembled’ or ‘embarked’ but not ‘deployed’ – and are now to wait on
the fringes, perhaps on the fringes of an armed conflict, awaiting UN authorization
to join the fray. This bizarre Irish Solution was followed in April 2007 by Oireachtas
approval of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Nordic
Battlegroup, stating that “the EU Battlegroups concept is complementary and
mutually reinforcing with the NATO Response Force”. There was no mention
whatsoever in the MOU of the fact that Ireland requires a UN mandate before it
troops could be deployed.
2. Military Operations
Just as the EU has not been standing still in the development of its military
capabilities, it has also not been idle in involving Member States’ troops in overseas
actions. The EU has been involved in a number of civilian, police and military
operations under the European Security and Defence Policy. Five of these have
been military operations, kick-started by military arrangements with NATO. All of
these operations have been UN mandated.
[Even back in 2004, the prestigious London-based International Institute of
Strategic Studies in its journal ‘Survival’ (Summer 2004) stated that – even though
the EU Member States were slipping behind in achieving the initial 2003 Headline
Goals -- there had been “a remarkable increase in the scale, distance and diversity of
external operations of European forces”. At that time, EU governments were
sustaining over 50,000 troops on operations outside their common boundaries in
over twenty countries, including S.E. Europe, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Iraq and
the Gulf and Africa.]

On St. Patrick’s Day, 2003, the ‘Berlin-Plus’ agreement was signed between the EU
and NATO, emphasizing the strategic partnership between the two organizations and
outlining the use of NATO assets and planning capabilities by the EU. Part of the
agreement was that NATO’s Deputy SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
-- who is always a European) would be Operation Commander of any EU-led
operations carried out under the Berlin Plus arrangements. The Operation
Headquarters would be NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE). However, the Operation Commander would be answerable to the EU.
This was the situation on March 31, 2003, when the NATO-led operation ‘Allied
Harmony’ in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was transferred to the EUled
Operation ‘Concordia’. Deputy SACEUR Admiral Rainer Feist from Germany
became head of the EU operation, directed from SHAPE. This terminated in
December 2003. The other ‘Berlin-Plus’ operation was ‘Althea’ in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which was launched with 6000 troops in December 2004, succeeding
NATO’s SFOR operation, and is still on-going although with reduced numbers (2500).
The first autonomous EU-led military operation was ‘Artemis’ in the Congo, from June
to September 2003, under French command and with mainly French soldiers. In
2006 there was another short autonomous operation in the Congo, EUFOR RD
Congo. In 2008, Ireland is set to participate in EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, with Irish troops
going to Chad and an Irishman being the EU Operation Commander – Lt. Gen.
Patrick Nash.
This is a controversial mission because of on-going fighting between rebel and
Government forces in the area but also because of the large presence of French
soldiers in the EU contingent. Former colonial power France has supported the Chad
President and has been helping Government forces beat back rebel offensives over
the last two years. It will be a challenge for the EU force to establish its neutrality – as
Lt. Gen Nash insists it will – and to ensure it can safely protect the refugees it has
been sent to help.
A 2007 study published as a Jean Monnet Working Paper, at New York University’s
School of Law [Dietmar Nickel and Gerrard Quille: “In the Shadow of the
Constitution: Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence
Policy Adapting to a Changing External Environment] comments on the evolving
military apparatus of the EU: e.g. the Civil and Military Planning Cell established in
2005, the new EU military Operations Centre and the new operational capabilities,
e.g. Battlegroups. It favourably quotes remarks from the BBC’s correspondent, Paul
Reynolds, that “The EU has quietly acquired what might be described as a standing
army”. The EU has now set in place the means to ensure that the EU’s evolving
military wing will not be short of military equipment.

3. European Defence Agency
Equipment short-falls are not something the European Security and Defence Policy
wants to endure. One of the things the new EU Treaty will be doing is formalizing
the European Defence Agency within the structures of the European Treaties.
“Article 28(3): Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military
capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research,
acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall identify operational
requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to
identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen
the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a
European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating
the improvement of military capabilities.”
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was mentioned in the original EU Constitution
in 2003. It appeared in the Constitution following the March 2003 EU Commission
Communication entitled “Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy”.By the time the
Constitution was signed by the Member States in June 2004, the EDA was already
established, with an initial budget for 2005 of €20m and the EU Foreign and
Security policy chief, Javier Solana, as its head. The controversial beginnings of the
EDA and the massive influence of the military-industrial complex in its formation are
well-documented in Ben Hayes excellent 2006 study for Statewatch and the
Transnational Institute: “Arming Big Brother”, which can be downloaded from the
PANA website: http://www.pana.ie/download/bigbrother.pdf
The Irish Government had no qualms about the new Agency. Indeed, Ireland joined
up in July 2004, following a decision by ‘the Government’. This decision was never
brought before the Dail for approval. Defence Minister Willie O’Dea stated the EDA
was an intergovernmental agency within the framework of the EU’s European
Security Defence Policy and that membership didn’t oblige or commit Ireland to do
anything other than contribute to the EDA’s budget. The fact that the EDA would be
in the business of promoting armaments didn’t seem to bother the Minister or the
Irish Government.
During the Nice Treaty debate, the then Foreign Minister, Brien Cowen, insisted
support for the arms industry was to be no where found in the Treaty (although
Article 17 did call for cooperation in the field of armaments between Member States:
“The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member
States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments”.)
Less than two years after ratifying Nice, Ireland was a paid up member of the
European Defence Agency.

After a November 2007 meeting of EU defence ministers, in which the EDA’s annual
budget was increased by a third ‘in a bid to improve the bloc’s military performance’,
Javier Solana expressed strong support for the increased investment in defence
technologies, stating it was an ‘absolute requirement for us to spend more, spend
better, and spend more together’. {EU Observer, Nov, 20, 2007).
The Irish Government has already committed itself (and us) in the new Treaty to
progressively improving our military capabilities, and Ireland’s membership of the
EDA bolsters that commitment. Indeed, then Enterprise, Trade and Employment
Minister, Miceal Martin, gave an interesting response to Green Party TD Eamon
Ryan, when Deputy Ryan enquired about the participation of Enterprise Ireland in
EDA meetings. (PQ 15612/07, in the name of Ciaran Cuffe, April 26, 2007). Minister
Martin said the following: “I understand that Enterprise Ireland has provided
preliminary technical assistance to the Department of Defence at EDA meetings in
relation to a research and development programme which the EDA has decided to
undertake and in which the Minister for Defence has determined that Ireland should
participate. On the basis of that decision, the Department of Defence has requested
the involvement of Enterprise Ireland in identifying Irish companies which may
potentially participate in this research programme and thereby benefit from the
funding which is available from EDA projects”.
Mr Nick Witney, then the Chief Executive of the EDA, addressed the Institute of
European Affairs in September, 2005, and outlined the benefits to Irish industry of
EDA membership. He described some Irish or Irish-based companies as being key
players in some defence-related sectors, such as armoured fighting vehicles and
defence electronics, and that coordinated procurement could put them in a better
position to be awarded defence equipment contracts in Europe.
http://www.google.ie/search?hl=en&safe=off&q=Institue+of+European+Affair...
iefing+on+the+EDA&btnG=Search&meta=cr%3DcountryIE
And so you have it: the new growth industry for Ireland!
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s [SIPRI] latest yearbook (Oct.
2007) states that the arms sales of the 100 largest arms-producing companies in the
world apart from China in 2005 totalled $290 billion. 40 US firms accounted for 63
per cent of the combined arms sales and some 32 West European companies
accounted for another 29 per cent.

The EDA, in its Long Term Vision statement released the end of 2006, stated:
“Today, Europe retains a widely capable defence technological and industrial base
(DTIB). But the prognosis is not encouraging. If Europe is to preserve a broadly based
and globally competitive DTIB (which means competitive with the US, and, increasingly,
producers in the Far East) it must take to heart the facts that US is outspending Europe
six to one in defence R&D; that it devotes some 35% of its defence expenditure to
investment (from a budget more than twice as large as that of the Europeans
combined), as against the European level of about 20%; and that it is increasingly
dominant in global export markets.”
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146
However, Seth Jones of the Washington-based RAND think tank, has been
impressed with the recent developments in the EU. In his just published book, The
Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 2007), he argues
that the evolving European security cooperation is “one of the most striking
developments in international politics today” and that “the development of a European
defence industry has important implications for the future of transatlantic defence
cooperation. It will increase the competition with Europe in the global arms market”.
In a recent (December 2007) Communication from the EU Commission to the EU
Council and the European Parliament – “A Strategy for a Stronger and More
Competitive European Defence Industry” – the Commission makes clear that this
emerging European Defence Industry will mean even more arms exports and a
boost to the global arms trade. The Communication draws attention to ‘the potential
new challenges and opportunities stemming from the rapidly emerging economies
and the potential re-emergence of other major competitors’ and states that ‘to ensure
that European companies benefit from these economic opportunities’, the
Commission has drawn up a ‘renewed market access strategy in emerging
economies’.
Both Afri and Amnesty International have well chronicled the involvement of certain
Irish industries in armaments production and the arms trade. This is not an area that
Irish people would like their Government to be encouraging. However our
membership of the EDA and the provisions in the new Treaty will be doing just that.
Military Provisions in the Treaty
The European Defence Agency as outlined above is a major military item in the new
Treaty. However, despite what happens with the Treaty, it would be true to stay the
EDA is here to stay and will continue regardless. The importance of highlighting the
EDA in this publication is to emphasise how strong the military lobby is in the
decision-making processes of the EU, how major developments such as the EDA and
Rapid Reaction Forces and EU Battlegroups can be progressed without being
mentioned in EU Treaties, and how relentless the military agenda is in shaping the
future of the EU as a defence entity.

This military agenda is advanced by a number of new and significant developments
in the Treaty. These developments will be facilitated by institutional measures giving
the EU a stronger voice and role in international affairs, including;
• an EU Council President, who can serve up to five years, preside over EU
Summits and, in effect, be the public face of the EU, the Leader, to the
outside world. The President will be assisted by,
• a new post of an EU Foreign Minister in all but name (now to be called High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), and an
EU Department of Foreign Affairs (European External Action Service). The
High Representative will preside over the Council meetings of EU Foreign
Ministers: in effect, a civil-servant will now be in a superior position to the
Member States’ elected Foreign Ministers. He/she will also be a Vice-President
of the EU Commission and may be assuming a major role in the trade and
development aspects of EU foreign policy. A new Article 19(2) states that if
the EU has defined a common position in a particular foreign policy matter,
those Member States setting on the Security Council “shall request that the
High Representative be asked to present the Union’s position”.
There is a growing ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign and security policy. The need for
Member States to show mutual solidarity and loyalty to the EU’s Common Foreign
and Security policies (including defence) [“The Member States shall support the
Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and
mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area” – Article
11.(3)] and to subsume their own policies accordingly; to make their civilian and
military capabilities available to the EU; to progressively improve their military
capabilities; – these are all obligations set out in the Treaty, to be assisted by the
already established European Defence Agency.
The Treaty truly sets the foundations for a fully-fledged EU military alliance with the
inclusion for the first time of mutual solidarity/defence clauses and with the new
doctrine of Structured Cooperation, a form of mini-military alliances, established by a
small group of Member States, using the EU’s institutions and engaging in military
operations in the EU’s name. There has been vagueness in the past as to whether
the EU would establish a common defence between the Member States and the
wording of the Nice Treaty, that the progressive framing of a common Union
defence policy “might lead to a common defence should the European Council so
decide” is carried over into Article 11(1) of the Treaty, although the words ‘should
the European council so decide” have been dropped. However, in Article 28 A(2)
in the section of the Treaty detailing common security and defence policy, there is a
much more definite commitment to common defence: “The common security and
defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence
policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting
unanimously, so decides”. The Treaty’s provisions on Structured Cooperation, mutual
defence and the Solidarity Clause all lend support to this stronger interpretation of EU
intent, for they certainly facilitate the development of an EU common defence.
The Treaty also contains a new section on Energy policy, an element of which is to
‘ensure security of energy supply in the Union’. This is of course a necessity and is
most welcome. But it is important to be wary of how that energy supply might be
‘secured’. There has been considerable discussion within NATO and the EU, (e.g. the
EU’s Institute for Security Studies) on the military issues surrounding ensuring energy
supplies. An article in NATO Review, Summer 2007, (NATO and the EU:
Cooperation and Security) argues that ‘Another promising area for future EU-NATO
cooperation is energy security’ and that ‘there is a need to develop coordinated
responses to these challenges [energy security] which incorporate the capabilities and
thinking of the armed forces and defence industries, a domain in which the Alliance
{[NATO] is better positioned to come up with new answers”. The EU and NATO
should be cooperating in the ‘securitisation of energy infrastructure networks’.
The remainder of this study will focus on Structured Cooperation and the Mutual
Defence/Solidarity clauses. Much of this analysis is similar to that in the PANA study
on the EU Constitution because these clauses have been maintained and merely
transferred to the new Treaty.
1. Structured Cooperation
Enhanced cooperation was a phrase much used during the Nice Treaty. It is a
mechanism allowing a group of States to forge ahead in an aspect of EU development
that not all Member States may be ready or willing to join in. Critics of enhanced
cooperation point to the fact that it could lead to a two-tier, two-speed Europe, with an
elite corps moving to closer integration while others were left outside, in a lesser
status. The Irish Government made much of the fact, during the Nice debate, that
enhanced cooperation – while applying to some aspects of EU foreign policy – did
not apply to defence matters.
The Lisbon Treaty has changed all that. In addition to the fact that the current
exclusion of enhanced cooperation in the field of defence in Article 27b (Treaty of
European Union) will be dropped, Member States may establish ‘Structured
Cooperation’ among themselves on military matters. Article 28 A(6).: “Those
Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most
demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union
framework.” This cooperation is governed by several provisions and a Protocol on
Structured Cooperation.

Those Member States with ‘more binding commitments’ are now allowed to set up
permanent military structures within the EU institutions. Those wishing to establish
such mini-alliances must inform the European Council and the foreign
affairs/security High Representative, and the Council will approve the Structured
Cooperation and the list of participating Member States by qualified majority vote.
Admission of new members to the Structured Cooperation shall also be determined
by QMV but only the Member States already participating in Structured
Cooperation can vote. (Article 28 E).
In other words, Ireland could be opposed to the establishment of Structured
Cooperation by a group of States but not be able to veto it. In addition, Article 28
E 6 states: “The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework
of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to
5 [dealing with admission, suspension or withdrawal of membership] shall be adopted
by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the
votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only”, i.e. the
functioning of Structured Cooperation is subject to unanimity but only the states
taking part in the Structured Cooperation can vote. There is a lack of clarity as to
what this section means in practice. What sort of ‘decision’ and ‘recommendations’
are to be decided upon exclusively by this vanguard EU military grouping.
Furthermore, Article 28 C allows the Council to ‘entrust the implementation of a
[Petersberg] task to a group of MemberStates which are willing and have the
necessary capability for such a task’. The ‘management of the task’ shall be agreed
among themselves and the High Representative. Klaus Heeger, legal adviser to the
Independence/Democracy group in the European Parliament and an expert on the
EU treaties, sent PANA the following analysis: “According to the Treaty of Lisbon),
the implementation of Common Security and Defence Policy by a group of
Member States is to be distinguished from Structured Cooperation. Therefore,
structured cooperation can be considered as more far-reaching”. He goes on to say
that because the treaty provisions and the specific Protocol on Structured
Cooperation “don’t clarify this point, it remains unclear to what extent the member
states having established structured cooperation can define their own defence
policies and commitments within the ‘Union framework’.” There must also be
questions raised about control and accountability for what could be military actions
carried out in the EU’s name.
Structured Cooperation is also subject to a Protocol in the Treaty. It states that the
EU’s Petersberg Tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities of the member States
“in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces”. It would be very difficult
for the Irish Government to argue that the Structured Cooperation forces are not in
fact an EU army.

Expanding the Petersberg Tasks
PANA has always argued that the Petersberg Tasks are already broad enough to
include every military mission up to and including waging war. The original tasks of
humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions have now
been expanded into ‘joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance
tasks and post-conflict stabilisation. “All these tasks may contribute to the fight against
terrorism, including by supporting Third Countries in combating terrorism in their
territories” [Article 28 B (1). In its European Security Review (July 23, 2004), the
Brussels–based International Security Information Service (ISIS) stated that ‘joint
disarmament operations’ “could include anything from providing personal security to
UN inspectors to full scale invasions á la Iraq”.
The Government however will make great play of the following paragraph in the
Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation. This wording has been contained in
every EU Treaty since Maastricht: “the common security and defence policy of the
Union does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States”. This is taken to refer to the Neutrals. However, the next two
paragraphs say the following: “Recalling that the common security and defence policy
of the Union respects the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty of those Member
States which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, which remains the foundation of the collective defence of it members,
and is compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that
framework; Convinced that a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters
will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with the
Berlin Plus arrangements [sharing EU/NATO assets]”.
Contributing to the “vitality of a renewed” NATO and stating that the EU’s common
security and defence policy is compatible with NATO’s should hardly be the goal of a
neutral state.

The Protocol goes on to state that the EU may assist the UN if requested in
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions but no where does it state that a UN
mandate would be a pre-requisite for any Structured Cooperation operation. Any
Member State wishing to participate in permanent Structured Cooperation must
“intensively develop its defence capacities”; “have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the
latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted
combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle
group,…”; and shall undertake to cooperate on the “level of investment expenditure on
defence equipment”, “bring their defence apparatus in line with each other as far as
possible”, increase interoperability, cooperate on capability development…”without
prejudice to undertakings in this regard within NATO”, and develop major joint
equipment programmes in the framework of the new European Defence Agency.

Paying for the EU’s New Military Might
The Irish taxpayer will have to pay for a proportion of the EU’s military operations.
The Treaty’s Article 28 (3) provides for the establishment of a start-up fund made
up of Member States’ contributions to fund preparatory activities for the Petersberg
Tasks. The procedures for establishing and administering the fund, and the financial
control procedures will be determined by QMV. Apart from the start-up fund,
Member States are also charged in accordance with the GNP scale for expenditures
arising from operations having military or defence implications Article 28(2).
Ireland also has to pay for the administrative expenditures of military operations
because administration expenditure (as opposed to operational expenditure of
military and defence) is paid by the Union budget, which all member states
subscribe to.
There are added complications in that the Council can decide unanimously to
charge all military/defence expenditure to the Union budget Article 28(2). A
Member State can also abstain from a decision authorising an operation with
military or defence implications and make a formal declaration refusing to finance
that operation.

However, there is no escaping: an increased EU military role is bound to bring
increased military costs upon Ireland and the Irish taxpayer – whether it be via the
new military start-up fund, a GNP ratio, or the EU Union budget. This is of course
quite apart from the obligations we have undertaken to ‘progressively improve’ our
military capacity.

Mutual Defence and Solidarity Clauses
Article 28 A (7) provides a mutual assistance clause for all EU member states in
case of an armed aggression. It states: “If a Member State is the victim of armed
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation
of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Art.51 of the
UN Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence
policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be
consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for
those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective
defence and the forum for its implementation”. (The failed EU Constitution had then
stated that the European Parliament would be regularly consulted on the CSDP and
be kept informed. This clause is removed in the Treaty.)
So the EU has devised a mutual defence (assistance) clause which the neutrals say
doesn’t ‘prejudice’ them and the NATO members say will be consistent with and in
cooperation with their commitments within the forum of NATO! It will be
fascinating to see how the Irish Government explains this clause. If we are attacked,
will our EU partners not come to our rescue because we’re neutral? Or is it just that we don’t go to their assistance because we’re neutral? And if our partners are now committed to protecting us, will it be under NATO that they come to our rescue? It
is in fact an Article that attaches to the EU ‘the qualities of a military pact, granting
mutual assistance to its members’, in the words of Jan Techau, at that time working
for the Germany Ministry of Defence. He also argued that this Article supports the
new instrument of Structured Cooperation, allowing an avant garde to forge ahead
in EU defence. [Paper delivered, in a personal capacity, before the U.S. Council for
European Studies, March 2004, “Roundtable on European Security Policy:
Conditions for Out of Area Missions in an Age of Borderless Conflicts”]
However, the clearest statement of the significance of this provision is provided by
the Rapporteur to the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Treaty of Lisbon, Andrew
Duff, MEP, a man who should know. In a letter he wrote to the Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on January 9, 2008, he
proposes that the NATO-linked nuclear-weapons based military grouping, the
Western European Union (WEU), should be dissolved. Previous EU Treaties had
already incorporated most of the WEU’s provisions. “The only surviving objective of
the WEU”, he writes, was to ‘afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy
of aggression’ also known as ‘collective self-defence’…However, this objective will
soon be covered by Article 28 A(7) of the Treaty on European Union as revised by
the Treaty of Lisbon”. He goes on to say: “The Treaty of Lisbon has taken the final
step in exporting all WEU competences into the European Union”.
The Solidarity Clause is no less problematic for Ireland. Article 188R: “The Union
and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union
shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made
available by the Member States, to:
a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect
democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in
the event of a terrorist attack;
b) assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in
the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
To implement the Solidarity Clause, assistance shall be requested by the political
authorities of the Member State(s) concerned and, if the assistance has military or
defence implications, decisions must be taken by unanimity (which allows for
abstentions).
This is a very broad mandate for it covers the threat of terrorism as well as an
actual terrorist attack, leaving the way open for pre-emptive military actions.

Indeed, between the time the Constitution was agreed at the June 2004 summit
and signed several months later in October, the phrase ‘victim of terrorist attack’
had been changed to the vaguer ‘object of a terrorist attack’. Does preventing the
terrorist threat in the territory of the Member State include attacking a country
outside the EU that is seen to be harbouring terrorists? What are the implications
under the Solidarity Clause for responding to, say, a threat by Al Qeada to attack
EU countries supplying troops to the war in Iraq? How are terrorists defined: are
they in the midst of anti-globalisation or anti-war protestors?
A Declaration was attached during the Irish Presidency (Declarations have no
legal strength) stating that: “Without prejudice to the measures adopted by the
Union to comply with solidarity obligations towards a Member State which is the
object of terrorist attack or the victim of natural or man-made disaster, none of the
provisions of Article 188R is intended to affect the right of another Member State
to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligations
towards that Member State”.
The Irish Government will point to this Declaration in an attempt to downplay
what is actually materialising in the EU Lisbon Treaty: mutual assistance and
solidarity obligations which underpin an EU military force and an EU Security
Strategy. In fact, the attached Declaration gives the Irish Government no more
leeway than it would have as a member of NATO: the NATO treaty doesn’t
require an automatic military response from all its members to an attack. Indeed,
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty states that, in case of attack, each NATO member
“will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
area”. [emphasis added]
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the renamed EU Constitution (The Lisbon Treaty)
puts in place the defence provisions for an EU State, the “qualities of a defence
pact”. If the Irish Government truly wanted to opt out of these provisions, it could
have attached a Protocol to the Treaty, as the Danes have, exempting Ireland
from participating in or paying for any EU military and defence activities. But it
has not done so.
Before accepting Taoiseach Ahern’s claims that Ireland’s traditional policy of
neutrality has been secured in the Treaty, remember that this is the Taoiseach
who defines traditional neutrality as allowing 1 million + US soldiers to transit
through Shannon on the way to an illegal/immoral war in Iraq in complete
contravention of International Law as stated in the Hague Convention of 1907.

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